Controversial additive
AMK is the generic term for the additive called AVGARD by its developers, ICI Americas Inc. of Wilmington, DE, a subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries PLC of London.

Adoption of the high molecular weight polymer additive isn't viewed highly by some members of the aviation community. The Air Transport Assn. of America doesn't believe enough research has been done on AMK, Roger Fleming, association vice president of operations, said before the crash.

Fleming said the ATA is concerned about how treated fuel would be effected by long-range, high-altitude flights when the fuel gets "coldsoaked." Would inflight engine restarts be possible and with what reliability rate? he asked, especially in view of the intercontinental twin-engine operations now under consideration.

Other concerns voiced by Fleming centered on the possibility that AMK might produce high levels of corroding sodium, and tends to clog fuel filters.

The Air Line Pilots Assn. wasn't enamored with AMK, but applauded the FAA's efforts for increased safety.

Even before the crash, John O'Brien, director of air safety and engineering for ALPA [Ed: See also ALPA letter to FAA of 1961], said the union sees AMK as more of a long-term project.

Of more immediate concern to the pilots were sturdier fuel lines and automatic fuel shutoff systems. O'Brien pointed out that for every major aircraft accident there were 10 minor incidents such as a tire blowout in which shredded rubber is flung against a fuel line, breaking it.

The FAA estimates that AMK would boost the cost of jet fuel by three to four cents per gallon. This would add up to more than $6.6 million a year for the 11 billion gallons consumed domestically annually, and 21 billions annually for world consumption.

Much data survived
AMK was the primary and most dramatic portion of the crash, but other elements were also tested: safer seats, passenger restraints, overhead bins, galleys.

Immediately following the crash it was feared that internal data recorders and cameras were destroyed by the fire, as well as the seats and dummies, many of them instrumented.

That would have left only the telemetered data for study, valuable in itself for future aircraft design but not in the same league as the data that would have come from the internal recorders and cameras. But in time it was learned that most of the data and film had survived.

The FAA was excited, said Feldman. The crash demonstration would be invaluable, but no information could be released.

But others, who requested and <illegible> ity, said many of the seats and dummies survived. The most intense heat was apparently at the rear of the plane with many of the seats located there almost completely destroyed. The crash was apparently within both the impact script and general aircraft design limits, not exceeding a 9 G forward force.

The films, according to the same sources, show relatively light forces on the dummies-forces that would result in less serious injuries than seen on survivors of real accidents.

There was little stress placed on the seats, and thus little deformation. As a result, said these sources, the crash demonstration could actually set back the cause of improved seats and restrains systems.

The early data available indicates it was a crash that one could walk away from--a "good landing"--except for the fire...and the FAA can't quite walk away from that.