The ICAO leaves it up to bureaucracies, like the FAA.Most of them, in turn, pass the buck for design innovation to the manufacturers.

The problem with that is inertia, says Chalmers Goodlin: "Engineering and executive thinking alike seems to have been afflicted with a form of psychological inertia which allows them to pursue only the easy way of getting designs done--that of laying next year's requirements over last year's airplane.

After every airline accident there's an investigation. Recommendations are made to remedy specific faults. Sometimes the advice is acted upon and people's lives are saved. Still, there's a growing sentiment in the aviation community that the "old ways" aren't working too well.

England's prestigious publication FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL questions whether we're "looking at things the right way." The influential magazine has editorially called for a fundamental reassessment for the "requirements for total air safety, from basic aircraft design upwards." Which brings us back to Vincent Burnelli's dream.

The 1935 crash of Burnelli's UB-14 near Newark Airport was due to faulty maintenance. But what would have been a disaster turned into a triumph. The pilot was Louis T. Reichers, later to become Chief of the Air Transport Command's Engineering Section. Listen: "The indicated airspeed was 195 m.p.h. at the time it became essential for me to make a crash landing. I flew the ship into the ground from about 200 ft. altitude and the estimated speed of contact was about 130 m.p.h., with the right wing being nearly vertical and absorbing the first shock. The impact caused the airplane to cartwheel, tearing off the engines and crushing the wings and tail group, with the body tumbling throughout but remaining intact. No fuel leaked from the wings. It is my firm belief that the box-body strength of this type, combined fwith the engines forward and the landing gear retracted saved myself and the engineering crew. Had the cabin been fully occupied with passengers with safety belts properly attached, no passengers would have been injured. This crash landing, in my opinion, was an extraordinary example of the safety provided by the lifting body type of design."

Wind tunnel and computer tests of the Burnelli are tantalizing. In addition to being demonstrably safer than conventional aircraft, it's less expensive to operate.

The Burnelli lifting body actually becomes aerodynamically more efficient as its speed and size increase. More lift+less drag=smaller power plants and reduced fuel consumption. So, inertia aside, why is the Burnelli just an intriguing aeronautical footnote? Some claim the answer lies in a single word: conspiracy.

Investment consultant Harry Schultz conducted an investigation into the Burnelli controversy. In a July 1979 issue of the International Harry Schultz Letter, he alleges that the Burnelli suffered an economically fatal crash in 1941. The wreckage, he contends, was strewn on the floor of the Oval Office. Here's the story, one which Schultz says he's verified:


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